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Introduction
Prior to the 1970s, many healthcare plans in the U.S. offered
benefits without discriminating between mental health and general
healthcare coverage.1 In the 1970s and 1980s, the cost of healthcare
increased dramatically and employers eliminated or limited mental
health benefits in an attempt to reduce insurance costs.2 To manage
insurance costs, employers began using more cost sharing mechanisms
and benefit caps on mental health benefits.3 However, these limitations
were not applied equally to mental health and general health benefits
and a coverage disparity was created.4
Today, insurers often do not provide coverage for mental health
on the same terms as general health.5 Patients with mental illness
face disability, dependence on social programs, incarceration, and
homelessness,6 while the mental healthcare system remains separate
from, and inferior to, the greater healthcare system.7 Private health
insurance plans continue to discriminate against patients with mental
illness and generally provide mental health coverage that is inferior
in comparison to general healthcare coverage.8 Unfortunately, mental
*Associate at Best, Best & Krieger, Riverside, California; J.D., University of Southern California,
Gould School of Law, 2011; USC Law and Mental Health Scholar, Saks Institute for Mental Health
Law, Policy, and Ethics; B.A., University of California, Davis, 2005. I would like to thank Professor
Elyn Saks, of the University of Southern California, Gould School of Law, for her guidance and
thoughtful advice in writing this article. I would also like to specifically thank each staff member
and board member of the Legislation & Policy Brief, at the Washington College of Law, for their
efforts in editing this article.
1
See Dana L. Kaplan, Can Legislation Alone Solve America’s Mental Health Dilemma? Current State
Legislative Schemes Cannot Achieve Mental Health Parity, 8 Quinnipiac Health L.J. 325, 328 (2005)
(discussing the emergence of the mental health parity movement).
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO/HEHS-00-9, Mental Health Parity Act: Despite New
Federal Standards, Mental Health Benefits Remain Limited, 5 (2000) [hereinafter GAO].
6
Richard G. Frank & Sherry A. Glied, Mental Health Policy in the United States since
1950: Better But Not Well 2 (2006). Although public social programs have been a key reason
for improving the living conditions of people with mental illness, these programs do not provide
enough resources to “lift” a person out of poverty. Id. In 1999, mentally ill people accounted for
approximately 35% of public disability and 28% of welfare recipients. In 2001 approximately 30%
of homeless single adults were mentally ill. Id.
7
Rep. Patrick J. Kennedy, Why We Must End Insurance Discrimination Against Mental Health Care,
41 Harv. J. on Legis. 363, 365 (2004).
8
GAO, supra note 5, at 3.
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illness remains on the fringes of the healthcare system, especially as it
relates to access to medical treatment.9
Accordingly, the goal of the mental health parity movement is to
require insurers to provide coverage for mental health on the same basis
as general health.10 The term “Mental health parity”, generally means
that insurance coverage for mental health services are subject to the
same terms and restrictions as coverage for all other health services.11
With this goal in mind, this article will provide a brief history of how
the current inequality in mental health insurance coverage developed.
Second, this article will examine the current debate around mental health
parity and will consider arguments from opponents and proponents.
Next, this article will examine and evaluate the effectiveness of state
and federal parity legislation, including the Mental Health Parity Act
of 1996, the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equality Act of 2008
and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010. Finally,
this article will advocate for additional parity protections and propose
comprehensive federal parity legislation.
I. The Development of Inequality in Mental Health Insurance
Background/Legislative History
The modern employment-based insurance system began as an employee recruiting tool during the Second World War and continued as
a result of union advocacy and federal policy.12 In 1958, 68% of the U.S.
population was insured, with employers providing 75% of the insurance, nearly tripling the pre-war figure for employment-based insurance.13 In the late 1960’s, 92% of employment-based insurance offered
some form of mental health coverage.14 As employment-based insurance became dominant in the 1960s, some plans implemented special
restrictions on mental health services that were not applicable to other
types of care.15 Restrictions on mental health services included: higher
level of cost sharing (often as high as a fifty percent co-payment, lower
utilization limits) and lower dollar caps on overall usage.16
Since the 1970s, health insurance policies have been moving further
away from mental health parity.17 Mental health consumers now face
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Mental Health: A Report of The Surgeon General
426 (1999) [hereinafter Surgeon General 1999] (explaining that the term “‘[p]arity’ refers to the
effort to treat mental health financing on the same basis as financing for general health services.”).
10
Id.
11
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Parity in Coverage of Mental Health Services in an
Era of Managed Care, 7 n. 1 (1997) [hereinafter DHHS 1997].
12
Frank & Glied, supra note 6, at 56-57.
13
Id. at 57.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
DHHS 1997, supra note 11, at 10. See also Kaplan, supra note 1, at 328.
9
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higher deductibles, higher co-payments, lower policy limits for office
visits, lower lifetime maximums and lower annual maximums.18 Thus,
mental health coverage does not protect against catastrophic loss as
the insurance industry merely offer coverage for “affordable financial
losses and virtually no protection against large and potentially ruinous
expenses for treatment of mental disorders.”19 Specifically, the lack of
parity in mental health coverage has resulted in out-of-pocket expenses
that are greatly disproportionate to that of general health.20
As a result of this discrimination, mental health consumers are subject
to a two-tiered healthcare system: one for the mind and one for the body.
For example, a New York firefighter sustained a back injury during rescue
efforts at Ground Zero and also suffers from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
(PTSD). His insurer provided unlimited care for his back treatment, but
his mental health outpatient benefits were limited to twenty visits a year
“regardless of the pain or disability he experiences, for his PTSD.”21
II. Opponents of Parity: Inadequate Justification
For Differential Treatment of Menatl Health
According to opponents of mental health parity, unequal mental health
coverage arose due to market forces, specifically moral hazard and adverse
selection.22 However, parity opponents fail to recognize the inapplicability
of these market forces in a system of managed care and overlook the fact that
the public mental health system has facilitated insurance discrimination.
A. Moral Hazard
Moral hazard represents the idea that as a healthcare plan becomes
more generous, consumer demand for the plan’s services increases.23
Specifically, “[m]oral hazard reflects a concern that if people with
insurance no longer have to pay the full costs of their own care, they
will use more services—services that they do not value at their full
cost.”24 Accordingly, increased demand results in higher utilization
DHHS 1997, supra note 11, at 12.
Frank & Glied, supra note 6, at 57.
20
DHHS 1997, supra note 11, at 10 (explaining that approximately $11 billion was spent outof-pocket by mental health consumers in 2001 alone). See also Frank & Glied, supra note 6, at 51
(Table 4.1).
21
Sen. Paul Wellstone, It’s Time to Act on Mental Health Parity Issue, The Hill, June 19, 2002, at 42.
22
Frank & Glied, supra note 6, at 57.
23
DHHS 1997, supra note 11, at 12 (pointing out that, for example, if co-payments and general
out-of-pocket expenses are lowered in a healthcare plan, then demand for health services under
that plan will increase). See id. at 12.
24
See Mental Health: A Report of the Attorney General, Financing and Managing Mental Health
Care: History of Financing and the Roots of Inequality, http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/
mentalhealth/chapter6/sec3.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2011) (discussing reasons for greater restrictions
in coverage of mental illness).
18
19
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and higher costs for the insurance provider.25 Through moral hazard,
over-utilization of benefits occurs when low cost insurance coverage
reduces the consumer’s economic incentives to economically utilize
health services.26 Moral hazard is applicable to the insurance industry
as a whole, but is particularly applicable to mental health because the
demand for mental healthcare coverage is more responsive to insurance
benefits than general healthcare.27
In fear of patient over-utilization, insurance providers have placed
more restrictions and cost sharing mechanisms on mental health coverage.28
A moral hazard justification for increased restrictions may have been true
under the fee-for-service system, as empirical evidence shows the effect
of moral hazard on mental healthcare demand.29 For instance, the RAND
Health Insurance Experiment found that an increased use of services by
consumers in response to decreased cost sharing for mental healthcare was
approximately double the observed rate for outpatient medical services
under fee-for-service insurance.30 However, the relevance and justification
of moral hazard is doubtful under the current managed care system.31
Several studies have found that expanding mental health coverage
under managed care has not resulted in substantial cost increases, thus
diminishing concerns about moral hazard.32
Under managed care, the utilization of benefits is rationed by
healthcare providers.33 Managed care integrates the delivery and
financing of care with the underlying purpose of containing medical
care costs.34 In a managed care system, the effect of moral hazard is
DHHS 1997, supra note 11, at 12.
See Kaplan, supra note 1, at 338 (discussing opposition to mental health parity).
27
See Richard G. Frank & Thomas G. McGuire, Parity for Mental Health and Substance Abuse Care
Under Managed Care, 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ., Research, Working Paper No. 6838, 1998) [hereinafter
Frank & McGuire] (discussing moral hazard in mental health care coverage).
28
See Jeffrey M. Barrett, Comment, A State Of Disorder: An Analysis Of Mental-Health Parity In
Wisconsin And A Suggestion For Future Legislation, 2008 Wis. L. Rev. 1159, 1169 (2008) (discussing
research which shows parity legislation has no measurable effect on the utilization of mentalhealth services). See also Frank & Glied, supra note 6, at 57 (discussing the economic phenomenon
of moral hazard and its effects on mental health coverage).
29
See Frank & McGuire, supra note 27, at 7 (discussing moral hazard’s effect on increased
restrictions on mental health care coverage).
30
See generally Willard G. Manning, et al., The RAND Corp., Effects of Mental Health Insurance:
Evidence from the Health Insurance Experiment (1989).
31
DHHS 1997, supra note 11, at 12. See also Colleen L. Barry & Susan H. Busch, Do State Parity
Laws Reduce the Financial Burden on Families of Children with Mental Health Care Needs?, 42 Health
Serv. Res. 1061, 1064 (June 2007) (stating that research has shown that through managed care,
the responsiveness of consumer demand can be curbed thus allowing increases in mental health
coverage without imposing great cost on the insurer).
32
Goldman, W. J., et al., Costs and Use of Mental Health Services Before and After Managed Care,
Health Affairs 17 (2): 40–52 (1998) (finding that after managed care “costs dropped by more than
40% in the six follow-up years, costs continued to decline slowly”).
33
Frank & McGuire, supra note 27, at 8.
34
See also Barrett, supra note 28, at 1186 (discussing further how the lack of incentives to limit cost
during the fee-for-service system led to “skyrocketing of mental-health costs in the mid-1980s”
and the development of the managed care system).
25
26
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removed because payment decisions are made before treatment.35 Patients
no longer have complete freedom to choose among physicians and
physicians no longer have complete freedom to select among treatment
options.36 Thus, insurers have greater control over costs as well as
greater control over access to treatment. Accordingly, the justification
for differential treatment of mental health based on a moral hazard
argument is flawed. Although managed care may reduce the affects of
moral hazard, managed care does not create full parity, and access to
mental health services still ranges widely among managed care plans.37
B. Adverse Selection
Opponents of parity argue that adverse selection justifies
differential treatment of mental health. The term “[a]dverse selection
reflects a concern that, in a market with voluntary insurance or multiple
insurers, plans that provide the most generous coverage will attract
individuals with the greatest need for care, leading to elevated service
use and costs for those insurers independent of their efficiency in
services provision.”38 Adverse selection applies to healthcare in general
and describes the process where high cost consumer populations select
health plans with more generous terms.39 Therefore, as consumers
select plans that fit actual or anticipated needs,40 the most generous
insurer will incur greater costs after being selected by high utilization
consumers with the greatest need for care, such as mental health
services consumers.41
According to this argument, insurers are incentivized by adverse
selection to avoid the higher costs of “bad risk” health consumers and
limit access to benefits.42 Thus, “[i]t has long been argued that good
mental health benefits [will] attract costly users, and that insurers [have]
an incentive to provide poor benefits to avoid these customers.”43 As a
result, the insurance industry has avoided the perceived additional cost
of adverse selection by decreasing parity for mental health coverage.44
Specifically, insurers have designed plans to allow fewer inpatient
Id.
Id.
37
Harold E. Varmus, National Institutes of Health, Parity in Financing Mental Health
Services: Managed Care Effects on Cost, Access, and Quality 21 (1998) (noting that accessibility
rates range “from 0.9 percent to 9.7 percent of members using outpatient specialty mental health
services”).
38
Surgeon General 1999, supra note 9, at 420, available at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/
library/mentalhealth/pdfs/c6.pdf.
39
DHHS 1997, supra note 11, at 12.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Frank & Glied, supra note 6, at 57-58.
43
Frank & McGuire, supra note 27, at 6.
44
DHHS 1997, supra note 11, at 12.
35
36
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visits, higher out-of-pocket expenses, and lower annual and lifetime
limits for mental illness than general health.45
However, opponents of parity fail to recognize that adverse selection
will be nullified when full parity is achieved. In a full parity insurance
market, all plans will offer equal coverage for mental health; therefore,
insurers will equally share the risk of over-utilization.46 Further,
opponents overlook the impact of managed care as a gatekeeper against
over-utilization, which also serves to limit the effect of adverse selection.47
C. The Impact of the Public Mental Healthcare System
The existence of a public mental healthcare system has facilitated
limitations on mental health parity48 by providing some mental health
services to consumers and inadvertently competing with private
insurance.49 Since 1987, private insurance has accounted for around 21%
of all mental health spending.50 However, government expenditures
have increased from 16.8% of all spending on mental health in 1971
to 34.7% in 2001.51 Thus, as insurers have increasingly limited mental
health benefit since the 1970s, the federal government has increased
expenditures for mental health.
Accordingly, the insurance industry has not met society’s need for
mental health insurance in an open competitive market.52 The perceived
costs of moral hazard and adverse selection, along with the lack of a
truly completive market, have led to inadequate coverage for mental
health consumers.53
See, e.g. Timothy A. Kelly, Healing the Broken Mind: Transforming America’s Failed
Mental Health System 95 (2009) (explaining that while insurers can do the same for other types
of benefits, they are more likely to do so with mental health benefits).
46
See, e.g., Maggie D. Gold, Must Insurers Treat All Illnesses Equally?, 4 Conn. Ins. L.J. 767, 777
(2005) and Barrett, supra note 28, at 1170.
47
See Kaplan supra note 1 (outlining opponents’ arguments without mentioning role of managed
care); see also supra text accompanying note 26.
48
Frank & Glied, supra note 6, at 58.
49
Id. at 51, 58 (noting in Table 4.1 that private insurance accounted for 12.3% of all spending on
mental health services in 1971, 22.2% in 1987, 23.9% in 1997 and 21.9% in 2001).
50
Id. at 51 (referring to Table 4.1).
51
Id. (noting that numbers provided are the combined total for Medicare and Medicaid).
52
Id. See also Community Voices, The Disparity Cavity: Filling America’s Oral
Health Gap, 1, 5 (2000) available at http://www.communityvoices.org/Uploads/
fiok23y4gwhfkg45ksbde3jb_20020826095615.pdf. As the debate over mental health insurance
parity continues, a parallel debate is occurring in the dental insurance industry. Similar to
proponents of mental health parity who argue that mental health is more than just a condition of
the mind, proponents of oral health parity argue that oral health is a condition of the body, not
just the mouth. Proponents of oral health argue that the costs of under-insuring dental patients
are as real as conditions affecting the body. Specifically, in 1989, a study found that as a result
of dental problems children in the U.S. missed 52 million hours of school and adults missed 164
million hours of work. Id. at 1. It is estimated that half of the U.S. population does not have
dental insurance, and one of the main reason for the lack of coverage is the “cost of adding dental
benefits to existing public and private insurance programs.” Id. at 7.
53
Frank & Glied, supra note 6, at 51-58.
45
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III. The Case For Equality in Mental Healthcare
As previously stated, the term “mental health parity” generally
means that insurance coverage for mental health services are subject
to the same terms and restrictions as coverage for all other health services.54 The argument for this definition of parity was not as strong as
initially presumed during the fee-for-service era.55 However the argument for parity under the current managed care system is compelling
because it allows for the welfare of mental health services consumers
to be maximized.56 This section will examine arguments made by proponents of parity legislation, the relationship of mental illness and general illness, the impact of mental illness on the economy, the minimal
cost of parity legislation, and the role of social stigma.
A. Is Mental Illness Distinguishable From Other Diseases?
“The human brain is the organ of the mind and just like the other
organs of our body, it is subject to mental illness.”57 Traditionally “the
treatment of the mind . . . has been considered non-scientific and nonmedical, mental illnesses have historically been regarded as shameful
personal failings, rather than treatable diseases.”58 However, research
demonstrates that mental illness is not separate and unrelated from
general health.59
Although the exact cause of most mental illness is unknown,
research has demonstrated that many mental illnesses result from a
combination of various factors. Psychological factors that may influence
mental illness include neglect, the loss of family early in life, and severe
psychological trauma, such as emotional, physical, or sexual abuse.60
Environmental factors that may influence mental illness include death,
divorce, dysfunctional family, poverty and substance abuse.61 Further,
a growing body of scientific research demonstrates that mental illness
DHHS 1997, supra note 11, at 7 n. 1.
See Frank & McGuire, supra note 27, at 5-7 (explaining that under the fee-for-service system,
because the welfare costs created by moral hazard is greater for mental health than general health,
due to a greater demand response, legislation seeking strict parity would not maximize mental
health consumers’ welfare because the efficient level of coinsurance is higher for mental health
than general health).
56
Id. at 12.
57
Mental Health Parity: Hearing of the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions,
106th Cong. 4-5 (2000) (statement of Sen. Pete V. Domenici).
58
Kennedy, supra note 7, at 364.
59
See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 7, at 367.
60
What are the Causes of Mental Illness?, The KIM Foundation, http://www.thekimfoundation.
org/html/about_mental_ill/causes.html.
61
Id.
54
55
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may be biochemical in nature62 and influenced by biological factors.63
Specific biological factors include genetics, infections, brain injury, and
prenatal damage.64
Moreover, the Surgeon General has stated that a distinction of
the mind from the body is not supported by science.65 Accordingly,
the stigma surrounding mental health should not dictate coverage.
Stereotypes and false assumptions that mental illness is not caused by
biological factors do not presume that with proper care, mental illness,
like general illness, is treatable.66 Accordingly, healthcare must be
provided equally because mental illness is not separate from general
illness.
B. Mental Health Insurance Discrimination & the Economy
Mental illness has direct and indirect costs on the U.S. economy.
Direct costs include: “medication, clinic visits, and hospitalization [and]
are relatively easy to quantify, but they reveal only a small portion of
the economic burden these illnesses place on society.”67 For instance,
in the U.S. in 1996, the direct cost for mental health treatment was $66
billion, or roughly 7% of the nation’s health care costs.68 Although this
figure is significant, it is dwarfed by the indirect costs of mental illness.
Indirect costs of mental illness resulting from disability or premature
death include lost earnings, homelessness, incarceration, and lost
productivity at the workplace, school, and home.69 The indirect costs of
mental illness are more burdensome to society than direct costs, but are
more difficult to quantify.70 For instance, in 1985, the first estimate of
lost earnings as a result of mental illness, as defined by the DSM-IV, was

Kennedy, supra note 7, at 367.
See, e.g., id. at 367 n.39 (citing brain research from the National Institute of Mental Health that
demonstrates the physiology of mental illnesses), Anne Rogers & David Pilgrim, Mental Health
and Inequality, 128 (2003) (explaining that depression and dementia have underlying biological
factors).
64
See KIM Foundation, supra note 60 (discussing biological, psychological, and environmental
factors contributing to mental illness).
65
Surgeon General 1999, supra note 9, at 5-6.
66
See Lorraine Schmall, One Step Closer to Mental Health Parity, 9 Nev. L.J. 646, 665 (2009)
(discussing that employers may “exclude illnesses based on stereotypes, false assumptions, or
costs . . . [while] overestimat[ing] the cost of providing mental health insurance”).
67
See Press Release, Nat’l Inst. of Mental Health, Mental Disorders Cost Society Billions in
Unearned Income (May 7, 2008), available at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/science-news/2008/mentaldisorders-cost-society-billions-in-unearned-income.shtml [hereinafter NIMH Press Release]
(discussing the costs of mental disorders).
68
Surgeon General 1999, supra note 9, at 412.
69
Id. at 411; see also NIMH Press Release, supra note 67 (discussing the costs of mental disorders).
70
NIMH Press Release, supra note 67 (discussing studies on the indirect costs arising from mental
disorders).
62
63
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$44.1 billion.71 In 1992, the estimated economic loss was $77 billion.72
Further, research revealed that in 2002, the U.S. economy lost $193 billion
in annual earnings as a result of serious mental illness alone.73
The total amount of lost earnings in the U.S. as a result of serious
mental illness has been increasing. For instance, in 1992, total of lost
earnings as a result of serious mental illness was $76 billion.74 Although
these figures are staggering, these estimates are conservative as they
did not include all indirect costs of mental illness and the data did
not include patients who suffer from chronic mental illness such as
schizophrenia or autism.75
Considering the economic loss due to mental illness, parity
legislation is needed to reduce economic loss and to increase the quality
of care for mental health consumers. Parity legislation will reduce the
economic loss to society by ensuring that mental illness will not go
untreated because of insurance discrimination. It is established that
untreated mental illness incurs a great economic loss to business and
society.76 For example, clinical depression in 1995 cost businesses in the
U.S. approximately $28.8 billion in lost productivity and increased use
of sick leave.77 Tragically, “[l]ost earnings due to depression-induced
suicide total[ed] $ 7.5 billion,” yet, when treated, “the success rate for
clinical depression is over 80 percent.”78
Increasing access to treatment also has a direct benefit for
employers. Research has shown that work productivity will improve
by three hours if a depressed employee receives enhanced treatment
weekly,79 thereby reducing indirect costs to employers and society.
For instance, researchers have found that “when savings for general
medical services and indirect costs are considered, providing mental
health coverage commensurate to physical health coverage for all U.S.
See Ronald C. Kessler et al., Individual and Societal Effects of Mental Disorders on Earnings in the
United States: Results from the National Comorbidity Survey Replication, 165 Am. J. of Psychiatry
703, 703 (2008) (citing an estimate made by Rice et al. in a report commissioned by the U.S.
Public Health Service, which used data from the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH)
Epidemiologic Catchment Area (ECA) study).
72
See id. (citing an updated estimate by Harwood et al. in a report commissioned by NIMH that
used data from the National Comorbidity Survey (NCS)).
73
See id. at 707 (attributing the increase from prior estimates to inflation and controlling for
education, marital status, and household size).
74
See Thomas R. Insel, Assessing the Economic Costs of Serious Mental Illness, 165 Am. J. of Psychiatry
6 (2008) (discussing components of the economic burden of serious mental illness (see Table 1)).
75
NIMH Press Release, supra note 67.
76
See e.g., Surgeon General 1999, supra note 9, at 360, 411, 413; Assessing Mental Health Parity:
Implications for Patients and Employers: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Employer-Employee Relations of
the H. Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 107th Cong. 148, appendix O (2002) [hereinafter Relations
Hearing] (statement of the American Medical Association).
77
Relations Hearing, supra note 76, at 148.
78
Kaplan, supra note 1, at 332.
79
Phillip S. Wang, Telephone Screening, Outreach, and Care Management for Depressed Workers and
Impact on Clinical and Work Productivity Outcomes: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 298 J. of the Am.
Med. Ass’n, 1401-11 (Sept. 26, 2007).
71
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children and adults would actually amount to a net annual savings of
$2.2 billion.”80 Thus, by providing mental health parity, a significant
portion of indirect costs will be saved.
When insurers consider adverse selection and moral hazard,
they attempt to save resources by restricting access to mental health
coverage,81 even though research has shown that cutting access
to service and treatment will increase overall costs. Mental health
consumers may overuse mental health insurance benefits and increase
insurance costs;82 however, by providing greater access to services and
treatment, overall costs to the employer and society will decline.
Several studies have illustrated the inverse relationship between
greater access to treatment and reduced cost for employers and society.
For example, a Connecticut employer reduced mental health coverage
for employees in an attempt to reduce costs and initially saved 30%,
but merely shifted the savings from mental health to general health
as “it saw a 37% increase in medical care expenses and sick leave use
by employees who needed mental health services.”83 By reducing
coverage for mental health, employees shifted mental health costs to
general healthcare expenditures and increased the direct and indirect
cost of mental illness.84 Accordingly, mental health parity legislation
will improve the lives of mental health consumers and reduce the
impact of mental illness on the economy.
C. The Modest Cost of Equality: We Cannot Afford Not To
The cost of inadequate mental healthcare is large, but the financial
cost to reduce this burden is minor.85 In 2007, the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) estimated that federal mandated parity legislation, with a
broad DSM definition of mental illness, would increase premiums for
group health insurance by approximately 0.4% if offered.86 Further CBO
estimates that the direct costs of mandated services would be equivalent
to 0.4% of employer-sponsored health insurance premiums.87
Additional studies have confirmed the CBO estimate, “pegging the
Gillian Friedman, The Case for Mental Health Parity, available at http://www.abilitymagazine.
com/Mental_Health_Parity.html
81
Kaplan, supra note 1, at 330.
82
See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 45, at 95.
83
See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 1, at 331; Robert A. Rosenheck et al., Effect of Declining Mental Health
Service Use on Employees of a Large Corporation, 18 Health Affairs 193, 194 (1999).
84
Roger Kathol, Steven M. Saravay, Antonio Lobo, & Johan Ormel, Epidemiologic Trends and Costs
of Fragmentation, 90 Med. Clin. N. Am. 549, 561 (2006) (noting decrease in productivity and a 22%
increase in absenteeism among users of behavioral health services after a reduction in coverage).
85
Kennedy, supra note 7, at 372.
86
Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate: H.R. 1424 Paul Wellstone Mental Health
and Addiction Equity Act of 2007 4 (Oct. 4, 2007), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/86xx/
doc8679/hr1424wm.pdf [hereinafter Cost Estimate].
87
Id. at 6.
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cost of parity legislation at 1%, or $ 1.32 per member per month.”88
Further, the CBO estimated the total direct costs of parity at $1.3 billion
in 2008, and $3.0 billion in 2012.89 However, these cost estimates pale
in comparison to the $193 billion in annual earnings lost as a result of
serious mental illness alone.90 Thus, an argument that mental health
parity is too expensive fails to realize that, as a society, we cannot afford
not to have parity.91
D. The Stigmatization of Mental Health &
Unequal Access to Healthcare
Most Americans are unaware of the discrimination faced by people
suffering from mental illness. In fact, one study conducted in 2010 found
that 7% of 2,940 participants had not even heard of the term “mental
health parity.”92 Compounded with the lack of awareness is the fact that
mental illness remains greatly stigmatized and stereotyped. In 1999,
the U.S. Surgeon General concluded that “[f]or our nation to reduce the
burden of mental illness, to improve access to care . . . stigma must no
longer be tolerated.”93
However, mental illness remains among the most stigmatized
human conditions.94 Recent research suggests that stereotypes of
people suffering from mental illness are actually increasing “and that
the stigma of mental illness remains a powerfully detrimental feature
of the lives of people with such conditions.”95 For instance, in 1950, a
study questioned a nationally representative sample of adults about
perceptions of mental illness96 and a follow up study was conducted
in 1996 to determine how perceptions had changed. The 1996 study
Kennedy, supra note 7, at 373.
Cost Estimate, supra note 86, at 7.
90
Supra note 69 and accompanying text.
91
Moreover an examination of states with parity legislation shows that the cost of parity is
modest. Kennedy, supra note 7, at 373 (demonstrating that states have experienced modest costs
by adopting parity legislation, including Vermont, “where mental health and substance abuse
spending [decreased] by 8% to 18% while increasing access to mental healthcare by 18% to 24%,
Maryland, where “after a small rise of less than one percentage point in the year of transition to
parity, mental health costs held steady in year two and declined in year three,” and Ohio, where
“behavioral health costs for HMO enrollees fell following implementation of full mental health
and substance abuse parity”).
92
Your Mental Health: A Survey of Americans’ Understanding of the Mental Health Parity Law,
American Psychological Association Harris Interactive (2011), available at: http://www.apa.org/news/
press/releases/parity-law.pdf.
93
Surgeon General 1999, supra note 9.
94
Garry Morris, Mental Health Issues and the Media 47 (2006).
95
Bruce G. Link, Jo C. Phelan, Michaeline Bresnahan, Ann Stueve, & Bernice A. Pescosolido,
Public Conceptions of Mental Illness: Labels, Causes, Dangerousness, and Social Distance, 89 Am. J. of
Pub. Health 1328, 1329 (1999).
96
Jo C. Phelan, Bruce G. Link, Ann Stueve, & Bernice A. Pescosolido, Public Conceptions of Mental
Illness in 1950 and 1996: What Is Mental Illness and Is It to be Feared?, 41 J. of Health and Social
Behavior No. 2, 188, 195 (2000).
88
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found that Americans were more likely to believe that mental illness is
caused by social deviance, mental deficiency, or cognitive impairment
then they were in 1950.97 Specifically, in 1950, 7.1% of the sample
described mental illness as corresponding to social deviance, while in
1996, this figure more than doubled to 15.5%.98 Further, in 1950, 6.5%
of the sample believed that mental illness corresponded to mental
deficiency or cognitive impairment, while in 1996, this figure more
than doubled to 13.8%.99 Additionally, Americans in 1996 perceived
people with mental illness as more frightening or violent than they did
in 1950.100 Specifically, in 1950, 7.2% of the sample perceived mental
illness as including violent characteristics, while in 1996, this figure
nearly doubled to 12.1%.101
Additionally, a study conducted in 1999 found “that symptoms
of mental illness remain strongly connected with public fears about
potential violence and with a desire for limited social interaction.”102
This study used the same nationwide survey data as the 1996 study
above to determine what Americans believe to cause mental health
disorders. Specifically, the study reported that that 32.8% of Americans
believed that schizophrenia is “very likely” or “somewhat likely” to
be caused by a person’s own bad character.103 The study also reported
that 45.1% of Americans believed that schizophrenia is “very likely”
or “somewhat likely” to be caused by the way a person was raised,
while 17.4% of Americans believed that schizophrenia is “very likely”
or “somewhat likely” to be caused by God’s will.104 Additionally, the
study found that 38.2% of Americans believed that major depression
is “very likely” or “somewhat likely” to be caused by a person’s own
bad character.105 The study also reported that 47.6% of Americans
believed that major depression is “very likely” or “somewhat likely” to
be caused by the way a person was raised, while 15.4% of Americans
believed that major depression is “very likely” or “somewhat likely” to
be caused by God’s will.106
Further, the 1999 study showed that Americans associate mental
illness with a propensity for violence. Specifically, the study found that
61% of Americans believed that patients with schizophrenia are “very
likely” or “somewhat likely” to be violent.107 The study also reported
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107

Id. at 195.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 196.
Id.
Link et al., supra note 95, at 1332.
Id. at 1330.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1331.
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that 33% of Americans believed that patients with major depression are
“very likely” or “somewhat likely” to be violent.108
These studies illustrate that negative stereotypes of people with
mental illness remain pervasive in the U.S.. However, research has
found that Americans generally prefer to avoid contact with people
suffering from mental illness altogether. Specifically, the 1999 study
found that 63% of Americans are “very likely” or “somewhat likely”
to desire social distance from people suffering from schizophrenia.109
Further, the study reported that 47% of Americans are “very likely” or
“somewhat likely” to desire social distance from people suffering from
major depression.110 Thus, it is clear that societal negative stereotypes
of people with mental illness, “or stigma, lead others to avoid living,
socializing, or working with, renting to, or employing people with
mental illnesses.”111
The impact of stigma on people with mental illness is powerful
and often deters people from seeking treatment, prevents them
from acknowledging their health problems and prevents them from
disclosing their illness to others.112 For example, a study conducted in
2002 found that when patients perceive negative attitudes toward their
mental illness, they have a reduced likelihood of believing that they
need help and are less likely to use mental health care.113 Further, other
studies have found that 24% to 29% of people suffering from mental
illness do not seek help because they are afraid of what people will
think.114
Accordingly, stigma prevents patients from seeking care, which in
turn affects the direct costs of mental illness. For example, approximately
40% of patients receiving antipsychotic medication do not fully comply
with prescribed regimens, resulting in increased re-hospitalization and
an $800 million increase in hospital costs worldwide.115
Finally, stigma is also perpetuated by insurance discriminating
against mental illness as “[i]t is assumed that having mental illness
Id.
Id. at 1332.
110
Id.
111
Frank & Glied, supra note 6, at 133.
112
Surgeon General 1999, supra note 9, at 454. See also Patrick Corrigan, How Stigma Interferes
With Mental Health Care, 59 Am. Psychologist No. 7, 614-15 (2004) (explaining that research has
shown that less than 30% of people suffering from psychiatric disorders seek treatment).
113
See generally Ramin Mojtabai, et al., Perceived Need and Help-Seeking in Adults with Mood, Anxiety,
or Substance Use Disorders, 59 Archives of General Psychiatry 77-84 (2002) (discussing 2002
study that “examined the correlates of various stages of help-seeking, including perceived need
for professional help, seeking such help, and from which professionals participants sought help”).
114
Ronald C. Kessler, et al., The Prevalence and Correlates of Untreated Serious Mental Illness, Health
Servs. Research 36:987-1007 (2001); Wells, et al., Perceived Barriers to Care in St. Louis (USA)
and Christchurch (NZ): Reasons for Not Seeking Professional Help for Psychological Distress, Social
Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology 29:155-164 (1994); see also supra note 95 (reporting that
24% of those without prior treatment failed to seek treatment because of what others may think).
115
Corrigan, supra note 112, at 615.
108
109
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is so special that it cannot be treated with … [all other] medical
conditions.” 116 Thus, by providing mental health parity and increased
access to treatment, the stigmatization of mental illness will be reduced,
benefiting mental health consumers and society by reducing the costs
associated with mental illness.
IV. The State Approach
State legislatures began to regulate the inadequacy of private
insurance and mental health coverage in 1971, when Connecticut
authorized the first mandated mental health parity law.117 In advancing
parity legislation, states serve a public interest by limiting the affects
of adverse selection and serve a budget interest by shifting the costs of
mental health service to insurance providers.118 By 2006, thirty-seven
states passed some form of parity legislation,119 and many have seen a
decrease in state budgetary expenditures on mental health.120
State legislation in the 1970s and 1980s mandated mental health
benefits, but did not address minimum levels of coverage and equality
between mental health and general healthcare.121 State legislation has
varied by coverage, definition, and eligibility, partly because of the lack
of true federal parity legislation.122 Some states like California have a
broad definition of mental illness, which includes all disorders listed
in the DSM-IV, while other states like Nevada define mental illness
narrowly as a “biologically based” illness or serious mental illness
(SMI).123 The type of benefit mandated by state legislation is generally
structured as one of three forms: mandated benefit, mandated offering
and mandated-if-offered.124 The following section will analyze state
parity legislation by the type of benefit and by definition of mental
illness.
Roger Kathol & Suzanne Gatteau, Healing Body and Mind: A Critical Issue for Health
Care Reform, 61-62 (2007).
117
See Frank & Glied, supra note 6, at 58 (discussing the trend for state legislatures to enact similar
legislation to fulfill states’ self-interests by saving money and public interest by providing mental
health coverage).
118
See id. at 51, 58 (showing, in Table 4.1, significant state expenditures in mental health
services: in 2001, the states accounted for 23.4% of $85.4 billion spent on mental health services,
approximately $20 billion).
119
Barry & Busch, supra note 31, at 1065.
120
Frank & Glied, supra note 6, at 58.
121
Barry & Busch, supra note 31, at 1064-65.
122
Id.; see also U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Pub. No. (SMA) 03-3822, The Effects of
the Vermont Mental Health and Substance Abuse Parity Law 2, Exhibit I.1 (2003) [hereinafter
Vermont Parity], available at http://mimh200.mimh.edu/PieDb/04988.pdf.
123
Id. at 3 n. b (noting that narrow definitions of mental illness commonly include only
“schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, major depressive disorder,
panic disorder, schizo-affective disorder, and delusional disorder”).
124
Id. at 2 n. a.
116
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A. Mandated Benefit: Legislation that Works

A mandated benefit “requires insurance plans to provide coverage
that meets a minimum coverage standard for mental health services”
and forces mental health coverage to be made “under the same terms
and conditions as the plan’s coverage for physical illnesses.”125 Vermont
and California have both enacted mandated benefit coverage.126
1. Vermont: A Broad Definition of Mental Illness
In 1998, Vermont implemented the most comprehensive parity
legislation in the U.S.127 The Vermont statute provides that a health
insurance plan128 may not create conditions that restrict access to mental
health treatment that are different than access for treatment for other
health conditions,129 and provides that all deductible or out-of-pocket
limits must apply equally.130 The Vermont statute also improves treatment
access by preventing insurers from excluding mental health service
providers who meet the plan’s participation requirements.131 The statute
also provides for a broad definition of mental illness, defining mental
illness as those listed in the mental disorders section of the International
Classification of Diseases, which is similar to the DSM.132
In 2003, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS) evaluated how the Vermont mental health parity laws affected
employers, the state’s largest insurers, and consumers.133 DHHS found
that parity did not cause employers to drop health coverage or switch
to self-insured products.134 Only 0.3% of employers dropped coverage
due to parity legislation, affecting only 0.07% of all employees, while
an insignificant number of employers avoided parity by switching
to self-insurance.135 These results are consistent with the inverse
relationship between mental health and general health spending,
and support the finding that parity does not increase overall costs to
employers and society.136
Kaplan, supra note 1, at 351.
Vermont Parity, supra note 122, at 2 Exhibit I.1.
127
Id. at ix; see also Kaplan, supra note 1, at 338.
128
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 8, § 4089b(b)(1) (West 2011) (defining health insurance plan as “any health
insurance policy or health benefit plan offered by a health insurer . . . [or] any health benefit plan
offered or administered by the state, or any subdivision or instrumentality of the state.”).
129
Id. § 4089b(c) (mandating benefit parity between general healthcare, and mental healthcare).
130
Id. § 4089b(c).
131
Id. § 4089b(c)(3).
132
Id. § 4089b(b)(2).
133
Vermont Parity, supra note 122, at ix.
134
Id. at 57.
135
Id. (indicating that only 8% of Vermont’s employees switch to a self-insured plan after parity
was implemented, but only 3% of those that switched did so as a result of parity).
136
Id. See also discussion supra Part IV.C (discussing how mental health parity reduces direct and
indirect costs borne by employers and society as a whole).
125
126
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Mental health consumers in Vermont have obtained greater access
to treatment as a result of parity.137 In Vermont, two major health plans,
Kaiser/Community Health Plan (Kaiser) and Blue Cross Blue Shield of
Vermont (BCBS), represented 80% of the privately insured population
when parity was enacted.138 However, after parity was introduced in
Vermont, mental health consumers were 18% to 24% more likely to
obtain mental health services through the Kaiser and BCBS plans.139
Unfortunately, BCBS prevented parity by carve-out practices, which
reduced access to treatment and the average number of outpatient
visits.140 Further, Kaiser mental health consumers experienced a 32%
reduction in their chance of receiving inpatient care as Kaiser increased
the use of alternative programs instead of hospitalization.141 Overall,
however, the average number of outpatient visits increased and “parity
improved access to and intensity of outpatient mental health services
among many health plan members in Vermont.”142
After the enactment of parity, Vermont mental health consumers
paid smaller amounts of the total direct cost of mental health spending.143
BCBS consumer cost sharing fell from 27% to 16%.144 In general, mental
health consumers saw reductions in cost sharing as a result of increased
access to outpatient services.145 Despite the overall increased access to
treatment, overall spending on mental health services declined by up
to 18%.146 Spending rose 4.4% for BCBS, or $2.32 annually per member,
while spending declined by 9% at Kaiser.147
Mental health parity has been largely accomplished in Vermont.
However, full parity has not been realized because a federal loophole
remains that enables employers to avoid parity laws by switching to
self-insurance.148 This federal loophole will be considered in Section VI.
2. California: A Limited Definition of Mental Illness
The California legislature has considered parity legislation since
the 1980s and in 1999 became the twenty-fifth state to adopt parity after
See Vermont Parity, supra note 122, at 58 (noting “the average number of outpatient visits per
user increased as well”).
138
See id. at 57-58 (discussing increased access to mental health care due to coverage by the two
providers).
139
See id. (“The likelihood of obtaining mental health services rose between 18 and 24 percent in
the two health plans as a result of parity.”).
140
See id. at 58 (“[F]or BCBSVT members who received their MH/SA benefits through the carveout, the use of managed care arrangements offset the effect of parity.”).
141
See id. (noting reduced chance of in-patient care under the Kaiser mental health plan).
142
See id. (noting overall increased access to mental health care through parity).
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
See id. at 59. See also infra, Section VI.
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enacting Assembly Bill 88 (A.B. 88).149 A.B. 88 mandates that health
insurance policies must provide coverage benefits for severe mental
illnesses.150 A.B. 88 mandates that financial terms and conditions must
be applied equally to mental and general health, including maximum
lifetime benefits, co-payments and deductibles.151
The mandated portions of California’s parity legislation are
similar to that of Vermont.152 However, A.B. 88 defines mental illness
as SMI.153 State classification of SMI vary, but A.B. 88’s definition of
SMI includes schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder
(manic depressive illness), major depressive disorders, panic disorder,
obsessive-compulsive disorder, pervasive developmental disorder or
autism, anorexia nervosa and bulimia nervosa.154 This list is a more
restrictive definition of mental illness than the DSM-IV and created
opposition among parity proponents.155
The goal of A.B. 88 is to improve quality and access to mental
health services for people with SMI.156 In 2001, after parity in California
went into effect, the California HealthCare Foundation published an
early evaluation.157 After intervening sixty stakeholders158 throughout
the state, the study found that “[a]t a minimum, there is widespread
agreement that health insurance benefits for mental health services have
been expanded” and that parity did not have an adverse consequence
on health insurance markets.159
Cal. Dep’t of Mental Health, Mental Health Parity-Barriers and Recommendations 3
(2005) [hereinafter Barriers and Recommendations].
150
1999 Cal. Assemb. B. 88 (adopted on September 27, 1999 and became effective January 1,
2000 by addition of section 1374.72 to the Health and Safety Code and section 10144.5 to the
Insurance Code) [hereinafter 1999 Cal. AB 88]. Specifically, Assembly Bill 88 mandates benefits for
outpatient services, in-patient hospital services, partial hospital services, and prescription drugs.
Assembly Bill 88 is a mandated-benefit statute but provides that prescriptions drugs must be
offered in parity “if the plan contract includes coverage for prescription drugs[,]” a mandate-ifoffered provision.
151
Id.
152
Compare 1999 Cal. AB 88, with 8 Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 8 § 4089b(c) (both employing an aggressive
mandated-benefit structure).
153
1999 Cal AB 88.
154
Id. (1999 Cal. AB 88 also provides additional parity protections for children with serious
emotional disturbances).
155
Assembly Health Committee, California Legislative Bill History, 1999 Legis. Bill Hist. 1999
Cal. Assemb. B. 88 (noting that while the although the CA Psychological Association supported
Assembly Bill 88, it argued that all mental illnesses should be included and sponsored a rival bill).
156
Barriers and Recommendations, supra note 149, at 3 (stating that the parity legislation also
intended to decrease the economic burden on the public, end discrimination, and reduce “the
stigma associated with mental illness and the delivery of mental health services”).
157
See Timothy Lake et al., Mathematics Policy Research, Inc., A Snapshot of the
Implementation of California’s Mental Health Parity Law, vii, 3 (February 20, 2002) (“[t]
he study’s purpose was to assess the perceived objectives, initial experiences, and anticipated
outcomes of the new law after its first year of implementation.”).
158
See id. at 3 (including government officials, health plan representatives, employers, providers
and mental health consumers).
159
See id. at 23 (discussing the assessment of the first year of implementation of parity).
149
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There is some empirical evidence that mental health consumers
received greater access to treatment post parity enactment. A 2002 case
study of two large California employers revealed that for one employer,
Employer B, consumers experienced a 24.1% increase in outpatient
utilization, an 11.4% increase in impatient utilization and a 17.5%
increase in intermediate care utilization.160 However with Employer
A, consumers experienced a 24.7% decrease in outpatient utilization,
a 33.9% decrease in impatient utilization and a 54.3% decrease in
intermediate care utilization.161 Although we generally expect an
increase in benefits to result in increased utilization,162 Employer
A operated under managed care, where moral hazard and adverse
selection do not control the responsiveness of consumer demand. 163
Accordingly, the demand curve for A’s generous health plan is less
responsive and, unlike Employer B, will not necessarily result in
increased utilization.164
The study also showed that parity legislation does not result
in undue increases in overall spending for employers. Employer A
experienced a 1.9% decrease in total expenditure per member per
year.165 Employer B, who was not operating under a managed care
system, experienced a 23.1% increase in total expenditure per member
per year.166 Initially, a large increase seems to demonstrate that mental
health parity will cause a rapid rise in healthcare costs; however the $12
increase in spending per member “was well under 1 percent of total
healthcare spending for employer B.”167 Additionally, California parity
laws do not include a cost increase exemption, such as the one percent
cost increase exemption in federal legislation.168 However, if California
had included a cost increase exemption, neither employer would
have been eligible. Thus, the study shows two principles in effect in
California: first, parity legislation increases access to care; and second,
parity legislation does not result in an undue burden on insurers, who
See Robert B. Branstrom & Roland Sturm, Economic Ground Rounds: An Early Case Study of the
Effects of California’s Mental Health Parity Legislation, 53:10 Psychiatric Serv. 1215, 1215-16 (2002)
[hereinafter Branstrom & Sturm] (“describ[ing] the experience of two large employer groups in
California that implemented parity in mental health benefits on January 1, 2001, under plans
provided through a managed behavioral health organization (MBHO)”).
161
See id. at 1215 (citing Table 1).
162
See supra note 23 and accompanying text (noting that as spending on mental health care rises,
utilization of facilities and services increases).
163
See Barrett, supra note 28, at 1169-70 (discussing the incapability of moral hazard and adverse
selection to parity in the era of managed care).
164
Branstrom & Sturm, supra note 160, at 1215.
165
Id. at 1216.
166
Id. This figure is significant, but certainly not unexpected when considering that moral hazard
and adverse selection remained in play in a plan without managed care.
167
Id.
168
Ramya Sundararaman & C. Stephen Redhead, Cong. Research Serv., RL 33820, The Mental
Health Parity Act: A Legislative History 15 (2007) [hereinafter CRS History].
160
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may actually experience a decline in overall spending.169
Despite parity legislation, the California Department of Mental
Health has found that barriers remain to prevent achievement of mental
health parity.170 The largest barrier to parity has been the difficulty that
mental health consumers face in obtaining understandable information
about policies, procedures and routine mental health services.171
Further, the goal of reducing the effects of social stigma has yet to be
attained.172 Despite the implementation of a parity structure, the need
for mental health services is still viewed with skepticism.173 Although
parity may have been accomplished on paper in California, there is
more work to be done to fully implement parity.174
B. Weaker Policy Formations of
Mental Health Parity Legislation
Besides mandated benefit parity legislation, states use two policy
formulations that offer less protection than full parity.175 First, a
mandated offering parity statute requires insurance providers to offer
optional mental health coverage to consumers, which may include
additional premiums.176 A mandated offering is less than full parity
because mental health consumers still bear additional costs of optional
mental health insurance.
Utah mental health parity legislation is a mandated offering statute,
which requires insurers to offer employers with fifty-one employees
or more, an insurance plan with no mental health coverage and an
insurance plan with mental health coverage with lifetime, annual, and
out-of-pocket limits in parity with general health.177 However, Utah
does not regulate cost sharing mechanisms before lifetime maximums
are met.178 Utah defines mental illness by DSM-IV, but specifically
excludes personality disorders, psychosexual disorders, learning
disabilities and mental retardation.179 Although parity is limited in
Branstrom & Sturm, supra note 160, at 1215-16.
Barriers and Recommendations, supra note 149, at 16.
171
Id.
172
Id.
173
Id.
174
Id. at 6.
175
CRS History, supra note 168, at 15.
176
Kaplan, supra note 1, at 352. These statutes also vary by how mental illness is defined. For
instance, Georgia has enacted a mandated-offering statute based on a broad DSM-IV definition
of mental illness while Nebraska’s mandated-offering statute defines mental illness by SMI. CRS
History, supra note 168, at 15.
177
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-625 (West 2011) (mandating that insurers must offer plans with
catastrophic mental health coverage, or coverage above the statutory minimum, no coverage
plans, and 50/50 plans to employers with two to fifty employees).
178
Id.
179
Id. (noting that Utah also excludes diagnoses related to marital and family problems as well
as diagnoses that are a result of “social, occupational, religious, or other social maladjustment”).
169
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Utah, two years after its enactment in 2000, Utah saw only a 0.9%
increase in mental health expenditures due to parity, while access to
mental health services generally increased.180
Unfortunately, because Utah has a mandated offering statute,
employers have the ability to avoid offering mental health coverage
by selecting a plan with no mental health benefits. In fact, the Utah
Insurance Department found that since the enactment of parity, some
employers have exploited this loophole and have reduced or eliminated
mental health coverage for their employees.181 Under any mandated
offering parity legislation employers have the ability to avoid providing
mental health coverage and defeat the purpose of the law.
Second, parity legislation is also constructed as a mandated-ifoffered statute. These statues require that if an employer offers mental
health benefits, then coverage must be in parity with general health.182
A mandated-if-offered statute offers the least parity protection because
it allows employers and insurers the opportunity to avoid parity by
providing no mental health coverage at all.183 Accordingly, legislatures
should not consider a mandated offering or a mandated-if-offering
statute in future parity legislation because neither can achieve full parity.
V. The Federal Approach & ERISA Preemption
Prior to the enactment of the Employee Retirement Income Securities
Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) a state solution to mental health discrimination
was at least possible. However, ERISA provided large multi-state
employers the right to self-insure and avoid state parity legislation.184
ERISA regulates pensions and “employee welfare plans” by establishing
judicial remedies, claim procedures, mandatory information disclosure,
and standards for benefits plan administrators.185
The primary objective of Congress in enacting ERISA was to
provide (1) protection of interstate commerce; (2) protect the interests
of participants and beneficiaries of employee benefit plans; and (3)
Utah Ins. Dep’t, 2004 Catastrophic Mental Health Report, 14-15 (February 27, 2004).
Id. at 19.
182
See Kaplan, supra note 1, at 353 (showing these statutes also vary by how mental illness is
defined); see also CRS History, supra note 168, at 14 (discussing, generally, results found in Table B:
Comparison of FEHB and State Parity Laws).
183
See Kaplan, supra note 1, at 352 (stating mandated-if-offered statutes require “an employer
to provide equal coverage for mental health services and other medical services if the employer
offers mental health coverage. The employer can omit from its plan insurance coverage for mental
health as a way of avoiding the statute’s requirements.”).
184
See Gerald N. Grob & Howard H. Goldman, The Dilemma of Federal Mental Health Policy:
Radical Reform or Incremental Change? 167 (2006) (noting self-insured employer health plans
are not required to follow state parity law).
185
See Elizabeth S. Boison, Mental Health Parity for Children and Adolescents: How Private Insurance
Discrimination and ERISA Have Kept American Youth From Getting the Treatment They Need, 13 Am.
U.J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 187, 200-01 (2005) (discussing how federal law has undermined states’
efforts to provide mental healthcare to children and teens).
180
181
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to establish uniform standards for the administration of employee
benefit plans.186 To achieve these goals, Congress provided that ERISA
standards would preempt state regulation of employee benefit plans.187
Through preemption, ERISA applies through a two-tier system.
First, the ERISA savings clause, exempts all state laws that regulate
insurance from preemption.188 However, the ERISA deemer clause
prevents state insurance law from regulating self-insured employment
health benefit plans.189 Thus under this two-tiered system employment
health benefit plans must comply with state and federal parity
legislation, however, self-insured employment health benefit plans are
exempt from state legislation through ERISA preemption.190
Since the enactment of ERISA, there has been a trend of employers
shifting to self-insured health plans. For instance, a study reported that
two years after ERISA was enacted only 4% of employee health benefits
were self-insured plans.191 However, the study found that in 1986, 47%
of employee health benefits were self-insured plans.192 Another study
found that in 1992, 67% of employee health benefits were self-insured
plans.193 While in 2003, “fifty-two percent of workers with employmentbased health care benefits were in self-insured plans.”194
These studies demonstrate a strong correlation between the use of
self-insured plans and the enactment of ERISA.195 “Still, it seems clear
that at least some and probably much of the increase in self-insurance
can be attributed to the desire to use ERISA to avoid state regulations
of one type or another.”196 Thus, ERISA has limited the states’ ability
to create mental health parity through legislation. Accordingly, federal
legislation is the only means available to ensure equal access to mental
health care.197

29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
See Boison, supra note 185, at 198-199 (discussing preemption under ERISA); see also 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144 (stating a state law may be preempted by a federal law either by implied preemption, field
preemption, or express preemption; notably, ERISA is an express preemption of state law); see also
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a); Beverly N. Rich, Tracking AB 540’s Potential Resilience: An Analysis of In-State
Tuition for Undocumented Students in Light of Martinez v. Regents of the University of California,
19 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Soc. Just. 297, 309 (2010) (providing an introduction to the federal preemption
doctrine).
188
See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
189
See id. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
190
Russell Korobkin, The Battle Over Self-Insured Health Plans, or “One Good Loophole Deserves
Another,” 5 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 89, 110 (2005).
191
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A. The Mental Health Parity Act of 1996: The First Step
In 1992, Senator Paul Wellstone and Senator John Danforth
introduced the first mental health parity legislation.198 Although the
bill was not enacted, it sparked debate in Congress and subsequently
the Clinton administration included parity provisions in the Clinton
healthcare reform package.199 Mental health parity did not gain
momentum until Senator Wellstone and Senator Pete Domenici
prominently placed the issue in the public agenda, as both Senators
had mental illness in their families.200 The Senators co-sponsored the
Mental Health Parity Act of 1996 (MHPA), which required parity for
annual and lifetime dollar limits for group health plans of at least
twenty-six employees. 201 However, MHPA was a mandated-if-offered
statute that would only apply the parity provisions to group health
plans that chose to provide mental health coverage.202
MHPA was enacted as an amendment to the 1997 VA-HUD
appropriations bill and was approved by the Senate after the addition
of a one percent cost increase exemption and after a small business
exception was changed to fifty employees.203 MHPA did not apply to the
eighty million employees and dependents in small group plans204 nor
did it apply to self-insured plans covered by ERISA.205 Due to ERISA,
MHPA failed to prevent large multi-state employers from switching to
self-insured plans to avoid parity.206 This limitation prevented mental
health parity for over sixty-five million Americas enrolled in selfinsured plans.207 Moreover, MHPA did not stop insurers from blocking
access to services through cost sharing provisions like increased copayments and out-of-pocket burdens on mental health consumers.208
After MHPA went into effect in 1998, the Government Accounting
Office determined that insurers were not in full compliance with the law
because insurers were circumventing the parity provisions by placing
restrictions and conditions on mental health consumers.209 MHPA did
not accomplish true parity, but it was received as a step in the right
direction by providing mental health consumers some protection from
Equitable Health Care for Severe Mental Illnesses Act of 1992, S. 2696, 102d Cong. (1992).
CRS History, supra note 168, at 3.
200
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financial ruin.210
B. The Mental Health Parity & Addiction
Equality Act of 2008: An Incomplete Step
MHPA included a sunset provision that allowed the law to expire
in 2001 unless renewed by Congress.211 Congress reauthorized MHPA
yearly, but attempts to broaden its scope have failed.212 Although “[f]
ederal employees and Members of Congress, have had equal access
to mental health and addiction services since 2001[,]”213 mental health
consumers waited over a decade for Congress to expand the scope of
federal parity legislation. On October 3, 2009, under the auspicious
of a $700 billion economic bailout package, President George Bush
signed into law the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health
Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 (“MHPAEA”).214 MHPAEA
took effect on January 1st, 2010215 and was received with praise despite
substantial limitations.216
MHPAEA expands parity protections offered by MHPA by
requiring equal terms and conditions between mental and general
health.217 Since MHPAEA was enacted as a section of ERISA, it reaches
far more mental health consumers than did MHPA and closes the selfinsured loophole.218 MHPAEA prevents discrimination against mental
health consumers by mandating parity for treatment limitations and
cost sharing provisions. 219 Specifically, it requires that group health
plans providing mental health coverage may not establish more
restrictive requirements or separate cost sharing requirements for
mental health.220 The bar on cost sharing discrimination includes
deductibles, co-payments, coinsurance, and out-of-pocket expenses.221
MHPAEA also protects mental health consumers from unequal
treatment limitations222 by specifically mandating parity for “frequency
of treatment, number of visits, days of coverage, or other similar limits
See also Kelly, supra note 45, at 9-10; Grob & Goldman, supra note 184; Barrett, supra note 28,
at 1177-78.
211
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212
CRS History, supra note 168, at 7-11.
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on scope or duration of treatment.”223 Treatment limitation parity was a
major victory for mental health consumers as insurers have traditionally
used cost shifting mechanisms to avoid MHPA parity mandates.224
MHPAEA does not offer full parity because it is a mandated-ifoffered statute, the weakest form of parity law.225 MHPAEA provides
that if an employer offers mental health coverage, any financial
requirements and treatment limitations must be “no more restrictive
than the predominant financial requirements applied to substantially
all medical and surgical benefits covered by the plan.”226 As of 2007,
six states (Arizona, Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana and Nebraska),
had mandated-if-offered parity legislation.227 However, research has
shown that mandated-if-offered parity legislation has no statistically
significant effect on admissions and no significant reduction of the
probability that an admitted mental health patient is uninsured.228
Thus, the MHPAEA, like state mandated-if-offered legislation, cannot
achieve full parity.
1. Exemptions, Limitations, and Definitions
Although MHPAEA retained the parity requirements for lifetime
and annual caps from the MHPA,229 it also contains several exceptions.
Specifically, MHPAEA retained the small business exception, which
excludes businesses of fifty employees or less from parity.230 However,
due to this one exemption alone, the MHPAEA does not cover over
forty-five million employees who work for businesses with less than
fifty employees.231 For instance, the Department of Labor reports
that in March of 2008, over forty-nine million people were employed
by businesses with less than fifty employees.232 In any given year
approximately 20% of Americans suffer from a mental disorder, while
15% of the adult population uses mental health services.233 Further,
Id. § 1185a(a)(3)(B)(ii).
See Grob & Goldman, supra note 184, at 167.
225
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the National Institute of Mental Health reported that in 2008, the
prevalence of serious mental illness in the U.S. was over 4%.234 Thus,
as a result of the small business exemption it is certain that millions of
people affected by mental illness are outside the scope of MHPAEA.
MHPAEA also retained a cost-increase exemption similar to
MHPA.235 Specifically, if mental health parity results in a cost increase
of two percent in the first year of implementation, then the insurer may
claim an exemption.236 Additionally, an insurer may also be exempt of
it has a one percent cost increase in any subsequent year.237
If such a cost is incurred, the plan is exempt for the plan
year following the year the cost was incurred. Thus, the
exemption lasts one year. After that, the plan is required
to comply again; however, if the plan incurs an increased
cost of at least one percent in that plan year, the plan
could claim the exemption for the following plan year.238
However, the Department of Labor’s interim final regulations to
implement MHPAEA do not provide any guidance for implementing
the increased cost exemption.239 Thus, until future regulatory guidance
is given, insurers seeking to claim the cost-increase exemption must
follow the exemption procedures provided by the Department of Labor
to implement MHPA regulations.240 Accordingly, insures seeking to
apply for cost increase exemption must demonstrate that the cost
increase was directly a result of the implementation of MHPAEA.241
Further, applicants for a cost exemption must demonstrate that the
increased cost was not a result of “trends in utilization and prices,
a random claims experience that is unlikely to persist, or seasonal
variation typically experienced in claims submission and payment
patterns.”242 Finally, if an exemption is given, then the insurer is subject
to government audits.243
However, MHPAEA is also susceptible to insurers avoiding parity
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because the law does not provide a provision to monitor compliance.244
Monitoring compliance is necessary as insurance companies have
proven to be creative in establishing new means of restricting access to
mental health care. For instance, insurers have attempted to discourage
mental health providers from participating in mental health plans by
making reimbursement more difficult.245
Determining how to define mental illness has been an area of
contention throughout the development of all mental health parity
legislation.246 MHPAEA avoided the conflict with insurers by giving
the insurer the authority to define mental illness.247 Some advocates of
parity mistakenly assume that the definition of mental illness is based
on serious mental illness, since DSM-IV is not used to define mental
illness in MHPAEA.248 However, MHPAEA specifically provides that
mental health conditions are “defined under the terms of the plan or
coverage.”249 Thus, employers and insurers can arbitrarily cherry pick250
the mental illnesses they will provide coverage for, if any, and defeat
mental health parity entirely.
MHPAEA is a step in the right direction; however it has left several
options available for insurers and employers to avoid implementation.
Moreover, as a mandated-if-offered statute, MHPAEA falls far short of
full parity.
C. The Patient Protection & Affordable Care Act
In 2010, President Obama signed into law the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act (PPACA)251 and the Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act (HCERA).252 The PPACA, as modified by
the HCERA, takes some steps towards extending the reach of federal
parity law. The Congressional intent behind the PPACA is to provide
Barrett, supra note 28, at 1180 (discussing shortcomings of the Mental Health Parity &
Addiction Equality Act of 2008).
245
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health insurance to almost all U.S. citizens and legal immigrants by
2014. In providing this coverage Congress also expanded insurance
coverage to millions of Americans suffering from mental illness and
substance abuse disorders.253
As previously discussed, federal mental health parity law prior to
PPACA did not include a mandate for mental health insurance coverage;
rather federal legislation general required that when a benefit is offered
it must be offered in parity, known as “mandated-if-offered” statutes.
However, the PPACA is the first federal legislation to create a coverage
mandate for mental health and substance abuse services.
Specifically, the PPACA provides that qualified health plans,
certain Medicaid benchmark and benchmark-equivalent plans and
plans offered through the individual market must provide an essential
health benefits package. The PPACA defines essential health benefits
broadly through ten general health care categories that include “mental
health and substance use disorder services, including behavioral health
treatment.”254 The PPACA does not specify what services are included
in the essential health benefits categories, but the act provides that the
scope of the essential health benefits should be equal to the benefits
typically provided in an employer’s health insurance plan.255 The
PPACA also provides additional guidance and definitions for the three
plan types affected by the essential health benefits mandate.
1. Qualified Health Plans (QHPs)
The PPACA defines qualified health plans as a properly certified
plan that is issued or recognized by each exchange which offer the plan;
that provides essential health benefits as described in the PPACA; and is
offered by a licensed health insurance insurer.256 Qualified health plans
that meet the statutory requirements of PPACA are required to include
the essential health benefits package,257 which will extend mental health
coverage to many Americans. However, this section alone does not
mandate full parity because the PPACA does not specify what health
care services must be included in the essential health benefits package.
See Brian Kopp, et al., New Federal Health Care Reform Legislation—Its Impact on Employers and
Employee Benefits Plans, 2010 Emerging Issues 4954 (discussing expanded coverage under the
Patient Protection & Affordable Care Act).
254
See PPACA § 1302(b) (2011) (explaining that essential health benefits include: (1) ambulatory
patient services, (2) emergency services, (3) hospitalization, (4) maternity and newborn care, (5)
mental health and substance use disorder services, including behavioral health treatment, (6)
prescription drugs, (7) rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices, (8) laboratory services,
(9) preventive and wellness services and chronic disease management, and (10) pediatric services,
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2. Certain Medicaid Benchmark &
Benchmark-Equivalent Plans
Medicaid is a federal entitlement program that is operated by the
individual states.258 To be eligible for Medicaid, an applicant must meet
certain group categorical and income requirements.259 Some groups are
mandatory and must be accepted by the states, including “pregnant
women, and poor individuals with disabilities or poor individuals over
age 64 who qualify for cash assistance under the Supplemental Security
Income (SSI) program.”260 However, other groups are not mandatory,
including pregnant women with an income between 133% and 185% of
the federal poverty level.261
Medicaid plans are offered through traditional state benefit plans
or state specified benchmark or benchmark-equivalent plans.262 Either
of these options may be provided as a managed care plan or a nonmanaged care plan. Under federal law enacted prior to the PPACA, all
Medicaid managed care plans that provide both medical and surgical
benefits and mental health or substance use disorder benefits must
meet federal parity requirements.263
The PPACA expands Medicaid parity requirements by addressing
the lack of parity in managed care Medicaid benchmark and benchmarkequivalent plans. Specially, the PPACA provides that managed care
Medicaid benchmark and benchmark-equivalent plans must provide
the essential health benefits package,264 including “mental health and
substance use disorder services.”265
The PPACA also expands mental health parity to certain nonmanaged care benchmark and benchmark-equivalent plans that offer
both medical and surgical benefits as well as mental health or substance
use disorder benefits.266 However, for these non-managed care plans,
the PPACA only extends parity for treatment limitations and financial
requirements.267 Congress has defined treatment limitations as “limits
on the frequency of treatment, number of visits, days of coverage, or
See Julie Stone, Cong. Research Serv., Medicaid and the State Children’s Health Insurance
Program (CHIP) Provisions in PPACA: Summary and Timeline 4 (2010) (discussing the PPACA’s
changes to Medicaid eligibility).
259
See id. (including children, pregnant women, families with dependent children, elderly, or
disabled).
260
See id. (discussing mandatory groups, which states must cover under Medicaid).
261
See id. (discussing optional eligibility groups, which states may choose to cover under
Medicaid).
262
Id. at 17.
263
Social Security Act § 1932(b)(8), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-2 (2010) [hereinafter SSA].
264
PPACA § 2001(c)(3).
265
PPACA § 1302(b).
266
PPACA § 2001(c)(3).
267
Id.
258

64

Federal Efforts to Achieve Mental Health Parity

other similar limits on the scope or duration of treatment.”268 While
financial requirements are defined as “deductibles, co-payments,
coinsurance, and out-of-pocket expenses, but excludes an aggregate
lifetime limit and an annual limit.”269
The PPACA does advance mental health parity overall through the
inclusion of mental health and substance abuse within the mandated
essential health benefits; however, the impact of the essential health
benefits package is currently unclear because their scope has yet to be
defined through the rulemaking process.270
3. Individual & Small Group Market Plans
The PPACA also requires new individual and small group market
plans to include essential health benefits.271 Requiring the essential
health benefits package, which includes mental health and substance
abuse coverage, is a significant step. However, the PPACA also
continues the MHPAEA small employer exception for businesses with
less than fifty employees, which limits the expansion of parity.272
Further, in some instances the PPACA even expands the reach of the
small business exception by modifying the definition of small employer.
Specifically, for group plans, which are nonfederal government plans,
the definition of small employer was amended to mean “an employer
who employed an average of at least 1 but not more than 100 employees
on business days during the preceding calendar year and who employs
at least 1 employee on the first day of the plan year.”273 Thus, the PPACA
has effectively extended the reach of the small employer exemption
and further reduced the impact of the MHPAEA by doubling the size
of the original definition of a small employer.
4. Limitations of the PPACA
The PPACA is a significant step in increasing access to mental
health care for millions of Americans. However, much like prior federal
parity efforts, the PPACA leaves several options open for insurers
and employers to avoid implementation. The PPACA mandates that
qualified health plans, certain Medicaid benchmark and benchmarkequivalent plans and plans offered through the individual market
must provide essential health benefits. However, this mandate does
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26(B)(3)(B)(iii) (2010).
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270
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not achieve full parity and in greatly weakened by changes to the small
employer exception.
Specifically, the PPACA does include mental health and substance
abuse disorders in the essential health benefits package, but the scope
of services that must be provided has not been specified.274 In terms
of mental health coverage, the essential health benefits package only
provides coverage for “mental health and substance use disorder
services, including behavioral health treatment.”275 The PPACA does
not mandate specific service or treatment; rather it only requires that
coverage is provided in all ten broad categories. Many questions remain
unanswered, such as if the essential health benefits package includes vital
mental health services like preventive services or even case management.
The PPACA has also hindered the achievement of mental health
parity by expanding the small employer exemption to federal parity
laws. By changing the definition of a small employer from fifty to one
hundred employees, the mandate for essential health benefits is greatly
weakened. Further, the PPACA continues many of the shortcomings of
MHPAEA. For instance, the MHPAEA did not set a federal definition of
mental illness, and in doing so avoided potential conflict with interest
groups by allowing the insurer to define mental illness.276 Likewise, the
PPACA does not set a federal definition of mental illness. Although
the PPACA has taken some steps to provide health care coverage to
Americans suffering from mental illness and substance abuse disorders,
it is clear that the PPACA has yet to achieve full parity.
VII. Policy Proposal: A Mental Health Parity Act with Teeth
Since federal legislation has yet to provide full mental health parity
and end discriminatory practices targeted at mental health consumers,
and because some states have yet to enact any form of parity legislation
to protect mental health consumers,277 additional federal legislation
must be advanced.
Mental health parity legislation should be drafted with four
underlying goals in mind. Parity should be implemented to: 1)
counteract the scientifically tenuous and discriminatory distinction
between mental illness and physical illness, 2) eliminate adverse
selection through mandatory parity, 3) reduce out-of-pocket expenses
for mental health consumers, and 4) to stimulate the economy by
increasing the productivity and societal contributions of the people
seeking mental health care.278
274
275
276
277
278
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Comprehensive mental health parity legislation should include
four essential elements: 1) type of mandate, 2) terms and conditions, 3)
definition of mental illness and 4) exemptions.279 First, considering the
limitations of the mandated offering and mandated-if-offered statutes,
anything short of mandated benefit legislation is unacceptable. As
a foundation for parity policy this cannot be open to negotiation.
Secondly, MHPAEA has already taken a significant step by requiring
coverage terms and conditions to be in parity under a mandated-ifoffered policy.280 A policy favoring equality among coverage terms and
conditions must be retained in any subsequent federal mental health
parity legislation. With these two premises in mind, the next step in
advancing mental health parity is to set a mental illness definition and
any exemptions.
A. Serious Mental Illness or DSM-IV?
A definition of mental illness must be set before Congress can
adequately address the needs of mental health consumers. Setting a
concrete definition for mental illness has been debated across academic
disciplines.281 Defining what constitutes a mental illness is not as simple
as defining general illnesses, since most mental illnesses do not have a
biological marker.282 Although mental illnesses often affect the brain
and are associated with brain chemistry, the root of mental illness is
largely unknown. 283
Before legislatures can adopt a definition of mental illness, a proper
perspective for understanding and treating mental health must first
be considered. One model for understanding mental health is the
biomedical model.284 This model assumes that all illness or disease can
“be fully accounted for by deviations from the norm of measurable
biological (somatic) variables.”285 Further “[t]he biomedical model not
only requires that disease be dealt with as an entity independent of social
behavior, it also demands that behavioral aberrations be explained on
the basis of disordered somatic (biochemical or neurophysiological)
processes.”286 However, this model is very limiting in that it overlooks
the impact that social and psychological factors have on mental health.
For instance, under a biomedical model it would not be possible to
Kaplan, supra note 1, at 351 (proposing another element in consideration of coverage for
substance abuse).
280
29 U.S.C. § 1185a(a)(3)(A).
281
Frank & Glied, supra note 6, at 9.
282
Id. See also Kelly, supra note 45, at 9 (stating that unlike communicable diseases, mental illness
has “no pathogen–no viral infection–that can be readily identified and treated”).
283
Kelly, supra note 45, at 9-10.
284
George L. Engel, The Need for a New Medical Model: A Challenge for Biomedicine, 196 Science 129
(1977).
285
Id.
286
Id.
279

Legislation & Policy Brief

67

explain why some patients experience depression symptoms as
“mental illness,” while other patients regard the same symptoms as
merely “problems of living.”287
However, mental illness can be more comprehensively understood
from a “biopsychosocial” perspective, which in turn will allow for a
broader definition of mental illness.288 According to the biopsychosocial
model, biological, psychological, and social factors all have a significant
role in human functioning in the context of disease or illness.289 The
biological component attempts to understand the cause of the mental
illness in terms of the functioning of the body. For instance, some
people may be genetically predisposed to mental illness and more
vulnerable than the average person.290 The psychological component
attempts to understand how psychological problems may cause mental
illness. For instance, there may be associations between certain patterns
of thinking and mental illness.291 Specifically, a person prone to
negative self-conclusions is more likely to become depressed.292 Finally,
the social component attempts to understand how social factors like
culture, socioeconomic status, and religion may impact mental health.
For instance, mental illness may be triggered by a person’s traumatic
and stressful life experiences.293
Under the biopsychosocial model physicians evaluate how all three
factors may contribute to the illness and patienthood, instead of merely
considering biological factors alone.294 Thus, a valid definition for mental
illness should account for each component of the biopsychosocial
model in order to reach a broader section of mental health consumers.
One definition advanced by the Surgeon General defines mental
illness as a term “refer[ing] collectively to all diagnosable mental
disorders . . . [which] are characterized by abnormalities in cognition,
emotion or mood, or the highest integrated aspects of behavior, such as
social interactions or planning of future activities.”295 As Kelly adeptly
points out, the operative word in the Surgeon General’s definition is
diagnosable, which serves to separate mental illness from less serious
life difficulties.296 Diagnosable means that the patient’s symptoms meet
the designated observable or reportable level for a recognized mental
illness in the current version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
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Mental Disorders.297
The current version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, DSM-IV-TR, was published by the American Psychiatric
Association to provide
diagnostic criteria for each mental disorder . . . as
guidelines for making diagnoses, because it has been
demonstrated that the use of such criteria enhances
agreement among clinicians and investigators. . . .[The]
diagnostic criteria and the DSM-IV Classification
of mental disorders reflect a consensus of current
formulations of evolving knowledge in [the] field.298
Typically, insurers require a diagnosis in accordance with DSMIV criteria for eligibility for mental health treatment.299 A definition
of mental illness based on the DSM-IV has been advocated by
scholars300 and adopted by twenty-nine states in mental health parity
legislation as of 2007.301 However, opponents of mental health parity
are hostile to a definition of mental illness based on DSM-IV.302 Parity
opponents criticize Parity as defined by DSM-IV for allowing doctors
to subjectively decide if a patient’s condition qualifies as a disorder.303
Opposition also criticizes the DSM-IV for including disorders which
they find undeserving of parity, including developmental-arithmetic
disorder, oppositional-defiant disorder, caffeine intoxication and sleep
disorders resulting from jet lag.304
Even parity proponents are divided as to if all 297 mental health
disorders listed in DSM-IV should be treated equally.305 DSM-IV
attempts to include “every possible category of mental illness regardless
of severity … [and] includes forms of mental illness that do not warrant
the same level of attention as, say, schizophrenia or major depression.”306
See id. (describing how the DSM-IV is used to diagnose mental illness).
See Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders DSMIV, xxvii (4th ed. 1994) (describing the diagnostic criteria used in the mental health field).
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As a compromise, the concept of serious mental illness (“SMI”) has
been adopted in eleven state parity statutes.307 Although a consensus
definition has not emerged, the Surgeon General has stated that SMI
“generally applies to mental disorders that interfere with some area of
social functioning . . . [and] includes schizophrenia, bipolar disorder,
and other severe forms of depression, panic disorder, and obsessive
compulsive disorder.”308
The Surgeon General’s SMI definition includes psychotic mood
and anxiety disorders, which respectively are the most severe and the
most common mental illnesses.309 However, this definition excludes:
personality disorders; child disorders such as attention deficit disorder,
and hyperactivity disorder; eating disorders and substance abuse
disorders, which are also common, debilitating and disabling.310
Thus, a definition for SMI should include the disorders included by
the Surgeon General but must also include psychotic disorder, mood
disorder, anxiety disorders, personality disorders, childhood disorders,
eating disorders and substance abuse disorders. 311 Only by mandating
parity according to this definition can policy makers ensure that those
most in need of care are protected.312
Further, the proposed SMI definition of mental illness for policy
purposes will enable Congress to draft a bill that will face less
opposition by not covering politically sensitive and controversial DMSIV diagnoses, such as jet lag and caffeine intoxication. Moreover, the
proposed SMI definition will not service an overbroad population. For
example, in 2006, it was estimated that 6% or 13.2 million adults in
the U.S. suffer from SMI.313 While in 2005, it was estimated that 26.2%
or 57.7 million adults in the U.S. had a mental illness as defined by
the DSM-IV, which includes individuals with little or no daily life
disruption.314 Since the proposed SMI definition is congruent with the
biopsychosocial model, while simultaneously prioritizing care and
resources to people with the most serious need, the proposed SMI
definition should be adopted in future legislation.
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B. Applicable Exemptions, Political Reality and Compromise
Federal parity legislation and state parity legislation have included
compliance exemptions for small businesses and a cost increase
exemption for employers.315 A perfect political climate would allow for
exemption-free legislation similar to California or Vermont. However,
exemptions have been provided as compromises to reduce opposition
from interest groups and thus ensure that the legislation is adopted.316
Seventeen states include a small business exemption to their mental
health parity legislation.317 These exemptions apply to employers with
less than a designated number of employees, ranging from 10 to 51.318
Parity opponents routinely cite a fear of a rise in healthcare costs as
a result of parity.319 Providing a small business exemption will help
prevent further opposition. A small business exemption was included
in MHPA and the MHPAEA and remains a political necessity to
successfully enact further mental health parity legislation.
Fourteen states include a cost-increase exemption to their mental
health parity legislation.320 These exemptions generally provide that
“if a health plan demonstrates that providing parity mental health
coverage raises the premium cost by more than a given %, they may
be exempt from the mental health parity requirements.” However, as
demonstrated with the examination of California’s and Utah’s parity
legislation, large employers should not expect a cost increase over
one percent and may even realize a reduction in overall cost. Even if a
modest cost-increase exemption is provided in future legislation, it is
unlikely that large employers will experience a cost-increase necessary
to qualify for an exemption. Accordingly, a modest one to two percent
cost-increase exemption should be included in future parity legislation.
This cost-increase exemption ultimately will not bar mental health
consumers from treatment, while its exclusion will increase opposition
among businesses and interest groups. Thus, to gain maximum support
for parity legislation, a small business and a modest cost-increase
exemption should be included.
Conclusion: Where Do We Go From Here?
The enactment of the MHPAEA and the PPACA were a significant
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step in the right direction towards parity, but to achieve full parity
Congress must pass mandated benefit legislation. However, society’s
discriminatory view and the stigma placed on mental healthcare must
be challenged before parity is truly achieved. Although parity legislation in some states has increased access to care and the quality of life
for mental health consumers, other states have adopted inadequate polices or nothing at all. Therefore, federal legislation is the only avenue
available to ensure parity for all Americans. Accordingly, the policy
recommendations in this article should be adopted as the next step towards full parity for mental health consumers.
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